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MAY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BE CONSIDERED AT CHEVRON STEP
ONE? THE THIRD CIRCUIT DANCES THE CHEVRON
TWO-STEP IN UNITED STATES v. GEISER
I.

INTRODUCTION

The revolution began in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 In this landmark decision, the United States Supreme
Court set forth a new standard for review of an agency's legal interpretation, specifically, an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers. 2 Under the "Chevron two-step," 3 federal courts must first ask
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."' 4
If so, then Congress's "clear" and "unambiguously expressed intent" is
controlling. 5 If not, then analysis proceeds to Chevron step two, where deference is accorded to an agency's statutory interpretation if such interpre1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Among legal scholars, the decision in Chevron is often
described as a "revolution." See, e.g., GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
434, 442-43 (4th ed. 2007) (describing Chevron as "quiet revolution" because, although Court may not have intended to revolutionize judicial review of agency
legal conclusions, subsequent application of Chevron achieved such outcome); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE
L.J. 2580, 2596 (2006) (noting that, although Supreme Court may not have intended it, Chevron has been viewed as "a kind of revolution"). Yet, despite common parlance, the extent to which Chevron may be regarded as revolutionary is
contested. Compare Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1271,
1279-80 (2008) (discussing Chevron as revolutionary inasmuch as it "challeng[ed]
the reigning principles of certainty and finality in statutory interpretation," but
arguing that Chevron is evolutionary in other aspects), and Cass R. Sunstein, Law
andAdministration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2074-75, 2082-90 (1990)
(noting that Chevron set forth distinctive theory of statutory interpretation), with
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1090-91, 1121 (2008) (concluding from empirical research "that there has
not been a Chevron 'revolution' at the Supreme Court level").
2. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243 (setting forth two-step test for deference to
agency interpretation). When Chevron first emerged, legal scholars noted its importance, and it remains a landmark decision today. See Criddle, supra note 1, at
1272 (noting that, in federal courts, Chevron is "the most cited case in modem
public law"); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
AdministrativeState, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 455-57 (1989) (discussing Chevron's significance, particularly that it ended practice ofjudicial vacillation among de novo
review or absolute deference to agency statutory interpretations); Sunstein, Law
and Administration,supra note 1, at 2075 ("Chevron promises to be a pillar in administrative law for many years to come.").
3. See, e.g., Sun Wen Chen v. Att'y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 2007)
(describing test for deference as "the familiar Chevron two-step"), overruled on other
grounds by Lin-Zheng v. Att'y Gen., 557 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2009).
4. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (setting forth first step in Chevron analysis).
5. See id. at 842-43 (explaining that both courts and agencies must effectuate
clear congressional intent).
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tation is based upon a "permissible," or reasonable, construction of the
statute. 6 With this two-part formulation, Chevron replaced ad hoc deference factors with a basic test to determine whether deference to an
7
agency's statutory interpretation is due.
Yet to highlight Chevron's importance is not to say that it is self-implementing.8 Indeed, although Chevron provided a new test to determine
whether a court should defer to an agency's statutory interpretation, the
decision contains little instruction regarding how to apply the test. 9 The
first step of the Chevron two-step is particularly difficult to apply. 10 Although it neatly divides statutes into two categories, clear or ambiguous,
and provides that clear congressional intent must be effectuated, the first
step of Chevron leaves an important question unanswered: "How clear is
clear?"' 1 Further, although the first step of Chevron instructs courts to deploy "traditional tools of statutory construction" in discerning congres6. See id. at 843 (providing second step in Chevron analysis).
7. See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 1, at 2082 (comparing Chevron to earlier standards for review of agency statutory interpretations). As Sunstein
succinctly states: "Before 1984, the law thus reflected a puzzling and relatively ad
hoc set of doctrines about when courts should defer to administrative interpretations of law. All this was changed by Chevron." Id. For further discussion of jurisprudence preceding Chevron, see infra note 40.
8. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DuKE LJ. 549, 551 (2009)
(arguing that Chevron "fails to supply courts with the tools" for determining
whether Congress has delegated interpretative authority to agency, such that deference to agency's statutory interpretation is due).
9. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1122-23 (stating that Chevron has "created an increasingly complicated set of doctrinal debates" concerning how it
should be applied); Note, A PragmaticApproach to Chevron, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1723,
1723 (1999) ("Chevron appears clear, but its application is not."). Specifically, Eskridge and Baer highlight that ambiguity surrounds the relationship of Chevron to
other deference regimes, how courts should determine whether congressional intent is clear and unambiguous at Chevron step one, and when the Chevron regime
should be applied in the first place. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1123
(listing lingering ambiguities with Chevron's application).
10. See Kenneth W. Starr et al., JudicialReview of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 365 (1987) (stating that Chevron step one
"raises some rather difficult questions of interpretation for the judiciary").
11. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DuKE LJ. 511, 520 (1989) (discussing ambiguity at Chevron step one, and
noting that ambiguity regarding when statute is "clear" prevents Chevron "from being an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions"). Faced with the question of "how clear is clear," courts and commentators have provided differing
answers. Compare Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Deference is appropriate where the relevant language,
carefully considered, can yield more than one reasonable interpretation, not
where discerning the only possible interpretation requires a taxing inquiry. Chevron is a recognition that the ambiguities in statutes are to be resolved by the agencies charged with implementing them, not a declaration that, when statutory
construction becomes difficult, we will throw up our hands and let regulatory agencies do it for us."), with Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 1, at 2091
("The Court's own decisions, however, suggest that the mere fact of a plausible
alternative view is insufficient" to deem statute unclear and ambiguous).
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sional intent, uncertainty remains as to precisely which tools should be
used. 12 Determining which tools of statutory construction are permissible
"is perhaps the most important question in the implementation of Chevron,"1 3 but presently, no majority opinion of the Supreme Court has ad14
dressed the precise issue.
Recently, however, the Third Circuit expressly considered whether
analysis of legislative history is a permissible tool of statutory construction
at Chevron step one. 15 In United States v. Geiser,16 the Third Circuit held

that analysis of legislative history is not permitted when assessing, at Chevron step one, whether there is clear congressional intent as to the precise
question at issue. 17 Instead, a unanimous panel held that only the plain
language of a statute may be considered. 18 The decision in Geiser places
the Third Circuit in direct disagreement with the First Circuit, which
maintains that use of legislative history "is permissible and even may be
required at stage one of Chevron."1 9
This Casebrief analyzes differing judicial approaches to Chevron step
one, and argues that the Third Circuit's decision in Geiser should be interpreted narrowly, such that analysis of legislative history at Chevron step one
is not permitted if statutory text is unambiguous, but remains permissible
to resolve ambiguity in statutory text.2 0 Part II provides an overview of
12. See Bressman, supra note 8, at 551 (arguing that because Chevron does not
specify which tools of statutory construction are permissible, courts select among
theories of statutory construction, including textualism, purposivism, and intentionalism); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1122-23 (noting that Chevron "has
created an increasingly complicated set of doctrinal debates about . . . the approach the Court should take and the evidence it ought to consider to determine
whether Congress has directly addressed an issue").
13. LAwSON, supra note 1, at 497.

14. See Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 388 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2005) (citing cases for proposition that Supreme Court precedent remains
unclear about whether legislative history may be considered at Chevron step one);
see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1092-93 (arguing that it is time for Supreme Court to "recognize, expressly, that statutory interpretation needs to be understood through a new lens, that of the modern administrativestate. Such a lens
requires fresh conceptualization of such judicial doctrines as the plain meaning
rule, purposive interpretation, legislative history, stare decisis, and the substantive
canons of statutory construction.").
15. See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292-94 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering use of legislative history at Chevron step one), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 937 (2009).
16. 527 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 937 (2009).
17. See id. at 294 ("In sum, the current state of Supreme Court and Third
Circuit jurisprudence demonstrates that legislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one.").
18. See id. (holding that Chevron step one determination of whether congressional intent is clear is strictly based upon consideration of statutory text).
19. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (permitting use of
legislative history at Chevron step one). For further discussion of the First Circuit's
decision in Succar, see infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of whether, in the wake of Geiser, consideration of legislative history is permissible at Chevron step one, see infra notes 112-33 and accompanying text.
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Chevron deference, and analyzes the ways in which the Supreme Court and
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have construed Chevron's first step. 2 1 Part
III details the Third Circuit's decision in Geiser that legislative history may
not be considered at Chevron step one. 22 Part IV considers the scope of
Geiser's holding, and argues that a narrow interpretation is best.23 Finally,
Part V concludes with a discussion of the significance of the Third Cir24
cuit's recent decision in Geiser.

II.

ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF CHEVRON

In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth a new standard for review of
agency statutory interpretations. 25 Although the Chevron opinion considers legislative history at the first step in the Chevron two-step, subsequent
Court cases are inconsistent in the use of legislative history at Chevron step
one, and the Court has not expressly ruled on the issue. 26 Application of
Chevron step one in several of the circuit courts mirrors this inconsistency. 2 7 In particular, although the First Circuit has expressly ruled that
legislative history is permissible at Chevron step one, other circuits-including the Third Circuit, prior to Geiser-lack an express ruling and consider
28
legislative history only some of the time.
21. For background concerning Chevron deference, see infra notes 25-38 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's application of Chevron step one, see infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text. For an overview of the
Third Circuit's application of Chevron step one prior to Geiser, see infra notes 78-86
and accompanying text. Finally, for an overview of Chevron step one analysis in the
other circuit courts, see infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the factual context and the Third Circuit's reasoning
in Geiser, see infra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
23. For arguments that Geiser's holding concerning Chevron step one is best
interpreted narrowly, see infra notes 112-33 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of excluding legislative history from consideration at Chevron step one, see infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
25. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (providing standard of review).
26. See id. at 862 (considering legislative history at Chevron step one); see also
Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 388 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting that Supreme Court precedent is unclear as to whether legislative history
may be considered at Chevron step one); Coke v. Long Island Health Care at
Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that Court "has issued mixed
messages as to whether a court may consider legislative history" at Chevron step
one), vacated, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006).
27. For a discussion of the application of Chevron step one in the circuit courts
of appeals, see infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the First Circuit's application of Chevron step one, see
infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
application of Chevron step one prior to Geiser,see infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. Finally, for a discussion of Chevron step one applied in other circuit
courts, see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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It "Began with a Bubble'

9

: The Emergence of Chevron Deference

Chevron called upon the Supreme Court to decide the legality of the
"bubble concept": whether the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
permitted the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulation providing for a plant-wide definition of "major stationary source," in which a
"stationary source" consisted of an entire industrial plant and all buildings
3°
within the plant complex (as if a bubble encompassed the plant).
Under this plant-wide definition of "stationary source," a plant could install or modify one pollution-emitting device without triggering permit requirements, so long as total plant emissions did not increase.3 1 EPA
defended its regulation by arguing that the statute's text and legislative
history were silent as to the propriety of the "bubble concept," providing
EPA with discretion in administering the statute. 3 2 EPA further argued

29. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1085 ("The much-toasted 'Chevron
Revolution' began with a bubble."). For an interesting account of EPA's litigation
strategy in Chevron, as well as an account of the Justices' deliberations, see id. at
1085-87.
30. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (stating question presented). The Clean Air
Act Amendments required that non-attainment states-that is, states that had not
achieved EPA's national ambient air quality standards-establish a permit program to regulate "new or modified major stationary sources." See id. (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 7502 (b) (6)) (providing context of Clean Air Act Amendments). Administering the Clean Air Act Amendments at the start of the Reagan administration,
new leadership at EPA had promulgated a regulation that permitted a state to
adopt a plant-wide definition of "stationary source." See id. at 852-59 (detailing
EPA regulations, particularly changes to definition of "stationary source" from one
presidential administration to next).
31. See id. at 840 (summarizing EPA regulation at issue); see also Eskridge &
Baer, supra note 1, at 1085 (explaining that "bubble concept" approach to defining
"stationary source" allowed plants to "flexibly offset increased emissions from one
building by reducing them elsewhere within the single plant").
32. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-58 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281 (Mar. 12,
1981)) (summarizing EPA argument concerning ambiguity of term "source" in
Clean Air Act Amendments). Specifically, "the EPA first noted that the definitional issue was not squarely addressed in either the statute or its legislative history
and therefore that the issue involved an agency 'judgment as how to best carry out
the Act.'" Id. at 858 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281).
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that its regulation was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. 33 The Su3 4
preme Court agreed, and upheld EPA's regulation.
The Court began its analysis by providing the standard for review of
an agency statutory interpretation, and in doing so, set forth what has become the well-known Chevron two-step:

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
35
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
33. See id. at 858 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281) (summarizing EPA arguments
that it reasonably exercised its discretion in defining "stationary source"). In particular, EPA argued that the plant-wide definition was most appropriate because
the alternative definition-under which each pollution-emitting structure constituted a "source," rather than the entire plant-would "act as a disincentive to new
investment and modernization by discouraging modifications to existing facilities,"
which, in turn, could "retard progress in air pollution control" because dirtier
equipment would not be replaced with cleaner models. See id. (citing 46 Fed. Reg.
16,281) (explaining EPA argument concerning propriety of plant-wide definition
of stationary source). Further, EPA argued that the plant-wide definition was most
appropriate because it would simplify EPA's regulations, as the same definition of
source could be used in multiple regulatory programs, thereby reducing confusion
and inconsistency. See id. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281) (summarizing EPA argument in favor of plant-wide definition). Finally, EPA addressed the concern that
the plant-wide definition would undermine attempts to curb air pollution, arguing
that other regulations remaining in place would "accomplish the fundamental purposes of achieving attainment with NAAQSs [national ambient air quality standards] as expeditiously as possible." See id. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281)
(explaining EPA argument that plant-wide definition did not undermine continued attainment of reduced air pollution levels).
34. See id. at 866 (reversing D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and holding that
EPA's regulation was permissible construction of statute).
35. Id. at 842-43. Just as significant as the precise standard of review is the
Court's articulation of the reasons why judges should defer to reasonable agency
interpretations: separation of powers, agency expertise, and democratic accountability. See id. at 843-45, 865-66 (explaining rationales underlying deference); cf
Criddle, supra note 1, at 1273 (noting that theoretical justifications for Chevron
deference are heavily debated among legal scholars). The premise of the separation of powers rationale is that Article I of the Constitution vests Congress, not the
judiciary or administrative agencies, with legislative power. See U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 1 ("All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States .

. . .").

Accordingly, when courts construe a statute, they must give

effect to congressional intent. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (stating that, when
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Applying this standard of review, the Court considered the statute's plain
language as well as legislative history at Chevron step one, and concluded
that no clear congressional intent existed as to the permissibility of the
bubble concept.3 6 At Chevron step two, the Court considered the statute's
purpose and history, and concluded that the regulation was a permissible
construction of the statute because it properly accommodated competing
policies of environmental protection and economic growth. 3 v Thus, the
Court deferred to the EPA's statutory interpretation and upheld its
38
regulation.
B.

The Supreme Court's Application of Chevron Step One

Strong evidence indicates that the Court did not intend its decision in
Chevron to create a new standard for judicial review of agency statutory
construing statute, if court "ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect"). Thus, if
a court ascertains congressional intent at Chevron step one, the court "must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear Congressional intent." See
id. (explaining rationale underlying Chevron step one). Similarly, at Chevron step
two, if Congress has expressly delegated interpretive authority to the agency, or if
Congress has implicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, the courts must respect the
congressional delegation and defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation. See
id. at 843-45 (explaining rationale underlying Chevron step two); see also FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) ("Such deference is
justified because '[t]he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest
are notjudicial ones."') (citation omitted); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501
U.S. 680, 696 (1991) ('judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statute it is authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to
the proper roles of the political and judicial branches."). But see Scalia, supra note
11, at 514-16 (rejecting separation of powers as theoretical justification for Chevron
deference).
The fact of agency expertise is further reason to defer. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
865 (justifying deference on grounds that "the regulatory scheme is technical and
complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion,
and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies") (citations omitted); see
also Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132 (explaining that deference is justified
"because of the agency's greater familiarity with the ever-changing facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects regulated"). Finally, deferring to agency interpretation on issues in which there is ambiguous congressional intent or a
statutory gap left for the agency to fill is justified because it furthers the process of
democratic accountability: as part of the executive branch, agencies are directly
accountable to the people. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 ("[I]t is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choicesresolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.").
36. See id. at 859-62 (applying Chevron step one).
37. See id. at 863-66 (applying Chevron step two).
38. See id. at 865-66 (applying deference and holding that regulation was permissible construction of statute).
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interpretations.3 9 Indeed, it is possible to read Chevron narrowly, as a
sheer application of prior precedent in which deference was possible only
when an agency applied the law to a set of facts, while pure questions of
law continued to be reviewed de novo. 40 Yet subsequent applications favored a broader view, which prevails today: Chevron set forth a distinct theory of statutory interpretation and established a canon of construction in
which a court must defer to clear congressional intent, or, if unclear, to an
41
agency's reasonable interpretation.
39. See id. at 844-45 (noting that Court has "long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme that it is entrusted to administer," and citing cases); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the MarshallPapers, 23
ENVrL. L. REP. 10606, 10613 (1993) (explaining that Justice Marshall's papers
demonstrate that Court did not perceive Chevron as landmark decision); Karin P.
Sheldon, "It's Not My Job to Care" UnderstandingJustice Scalia's Method of Statutory
Interpretation Through Sweet Home and Chevron, 24 B.C. ENvrL. Arr. L. REv. 487,
508 (1997) (quoting from Justice Stevens's letters to Justice Scalia to argue that
Justice Stevens did not view Chevron as setting forth entirely new standard of review

and theory of deference).
40. See LAWSON, supra note 1, at 442 ("It is therefore possible, and even natural, to read Chevron simply as a straightforward application of settled principles of
judicial review of agency legal conclusions, with the case presenting one of the
usual but not unheard-of situations in which the traditional panoply of factors warranted granting an agency deference on a pure question of law."); Sunstein, Law
and Administration, supra note 1, at 2076 (explaining that author of Chevron opinion, Justice Stevens, endorsed narrow view of Chevron, in which, consistent with
prior administrative law decisions, deference would be accorded only for applications of law to fact and not for pure questions of law). Indeed, only three years
after Chevron, Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca appeared to
place Chevron within the analytic framework of prior administrative law jurisprudence, in which deference to administrative agencies was only considered if the
issue presented a mixed question of law and fact, rather than a pure question of
law. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (explaining lack of deference in part because case presented "narrow legal question" rather than question of law applied to facts); Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 1, at 2084
(noting that Cardoza-Fonsecaseemed to indicate that courts would continue to review pure questions of law de novo, and apply Chevron only in cases involving
mixed questions of law and fact). But see Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 454-55 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (criticizing majority for departing from "well-established interpretation" of Chevron, which applies Chevron both to pure legal questions as well as to
mixed questions of law and fact).
41. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)
(discussing theoretical justifications for distinct Chevron rule of deference); Pauley
v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (same); NLRB v. United Food
& Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing cases to establish that majority's decision "demonstrates the continuing and
unchanged vitality of the test for judicial review of agency determinations of law set
forth in Chevron," despite contrary dicta in Cardoza-Fonseca);EINER ELHAUGHE, STAT-

How TO INTERPRET UNcLEAR LEGISLATION 79-84 (2008) (arguing that Chevron established new canon of construction). But cf United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (refining Chevron two-step by providing that,
before applying Chevron, court must first determine that agency interpretation was
promulgated in exercise of delegated authority to make rules carrying force of
law). Scholars contend that the appointment of Justice Scalia to the Court firmly
entrenched the broad view of Chevron in the Court's jurisprudence. See LAWSON,
UTORY DEFAULT RULES:
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The problem in establishing Chevron as a new standard of review-via
subsequent applications of it as a new standard, rather than from the Chevron decision itself-is that uncertainty developed in Chevron's application. 4 2 Chevron's first step instructs courts to apply "traditional tools of
statutory construction" to assess "whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue" such that "congressional intent" is "clear";
however, neither Chevron nor subsequent Court decisions expressly address which tools of statutory construction should be employed to discern
congressional intent. 43 As one commentator observes, application of
Chevron's first step often varies depending upon which theory of statutory
interpretation the Court adopts: intentionalism, purposivism, or
44
textualism.
As a result, three distinct approaches to the use of legislative history at
Chevron step one are apparent in the Supreme Court's application of Chevron step one. 45 In one approach, the Court considers legislative history as
supra note 1, at 443 (noting that Justice Scalia helped establish broad reading of
Chevron as controlling law in D.C. Circuit as well as on Supreme Court); Farina,
supra note 2, at 455 (" [T]he appointment of Justice Scalia added an even more
determined proponent of Chevron and the deferential model.").
42. Cf Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1122-23 (noting that Chevron "has
created an increasingly complicated set of doctrinal debates about . . . the approach the Court should take and the evidence it ought to consider to determine
whether Congress has directly addressed an issue"); Starr, supra note 10, at 365
(stating that Chevron step one "raises some rather difficult questions of interpretation for the judiciary").
43. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (instructing courts to employ "traditional
tools of statutory construction" to ascertain congressional intent); see also Santiago
v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 388 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that
Supreme Court precedent is unclear as to whether legislative history may be considered at first step of Chevron analysis); Coke v. Long Island Health Care at Home,
Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that Court "has issued mixed
messages as to whether a court may consider legislative history" at Chevron step
one), vacated, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006).
44. See Bressman, supra note 8, at 551-52 (categorizing modes of interpretation under Chevron step one). Bressman provides a clear explanation of the three
modes of statutory interpretation:
[I] ntentionalism sees Congress as intending a meaning, albeit expressing
it imperfectly in the chosen text. Purposivism understands Congress as
motivated by a general aim in enacting statutes, often imperfectly expressing that aim. Both permit courts to consult legislative history in pursuit
of legislative intent or purpose. Meanwhile, textualism denies that legislative history is a permissible interpretive source as this theory has a strikingly different view of legislative behavior. Textualism tends to conform
to public choice theory and the claim that Congress has no intent or
purpose distinct from those explicitly stated in the statutory text. Nevertheless, modem textualism invites courts to discern a meaning for awkward or imprecise language. . . . Textualists also have a constitutional
objection to the use of legislative history because Congress only enacted
the text.
Id.
45. For discussion of each of the three approaches, see infra notes 46-48 and
accompanying text.
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one among several tools of statutory construction used to ascertain congressional intent as to the precise question at issue. 46 In a separate approach, the Court considers legislative history at Chevron step one only if
the statutory text is ambiguous. 47 Finally, in other cases, although not expressly precluding the use of legislative history, the Court only considers
statutory text and structure at Chevron step one; if the court finds the text
ambiguous, the Court proceeds to Chevron step two, rather than using legislative history to resolve the textual ambiguity at step one. 48 A majority

46. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 587-600
(2004) (dicta) (construing statute based upon statutory text, structure, purpose,
and legislative history, and stating that application of Chevron framework was unnecessary because, given Court's construction of statute, agency interpretation
would be inconsistent with clear congressional intent at Chevron step one); Brown
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 147 (noting that although legislative history is not determinative, it "is certainly relevant" to discerning congressional intent); Pauley, 501
U.S. at 697-98 (finding that text and legislative history established clear congressional intent to delegate statutory interpretation to agency); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35-42 (1990) (stating that petitioner's interpretation
of plain language provided most "natural" and "commonsense" meaning, but then
examining context, purpose, and legislative history to conclude that Congress actually intended more narrow scope than plain language facially revealed); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 214 (1988) (using legislative history at
Chevron step one to confirm interpretation of unambiguous statutory text); United
Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. at 123-28 (discerning clear congressional intent from statutory text, structure, and legislative history); INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-50 (1987) (examining statutory text and legislative history as "traditional tools of statutory construction" to find clear and unambiguous
congressional intent at Chevron step one); Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 367-73 (1986) (discerning clear congressional
intent by determining that legislative history confirmed "plain reading" and "commonly accepted meaning" of statutory text).
47. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89-100
(2007) (stating that "[u]nder this Court's precedents, if the intent of Congress is
clear and unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at issue, that would
be the end of our analysis," but considering legislative history because of Court's
conclusion that statutory text was ambiguous) (citation omitted); Holly Farms
Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398-401 (1996) (concluding that congressional intent remained ambiguous after examination of text and legislative history); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 648-50 (1990) (using
legislative history at Chevron step one in attempt to interpret ambiguous statutory
text); cf Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132-33 (2002)
(stating that "reference to legislative history is inappropriate when the text of the
statute is unambiguous"); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293 n.4
(1988) (plurality) (noting that "reference to legislative history[ ] is in the first instance irrelevant" because analysis under Chevron step one begins with analysis of
plain language).
48. See, e.g., Barnhardt v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218-19 (2002) (finding no
clear congressional intent at Chevron step one, given ambiguous plain language);
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417-18 (1992)
(considering only plain language to find ambiguity at Chevron step one, and proceeding to step two); K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291-94 (assessing only statutory text at
Chevron step one).
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opinion of the Court has not determined which of these three methods is
proper.

49

In a recent case, however, concurring and dissenting opinions of the
Court squarely addressed the issue of which tools of statutory construction
should be utilized at Chevron's first step. 5 0 Zuni Public School District No. 89

v. Department of Education51 asked the Court to decide the validity of the
Secretary of Education's mode of calculating a state's per-pupil expenditures under the federal Impact Aid Act. 52 At Chevron step one, the majority discerned clear congressional intent to provide the Secretary with
discretion to select a calculation method, and at Chevron step two, concluded that the Secretary reasonably exercised its discretion. 5 3 Notably, in
the analysis at Chevron step one, the majority departed from traditional
practice, assessing the statute's purpose and legislative history prior to as54
sessing the plain language.
Concurring and dissenting opinions emerged in response to the majority's consideration of legislative history prior to statutory text, and in
responding to this mode of statutory interpretation, the opinions debated
the propriety of considering legislative history at Chevron step one. 5 5 Con49. See Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 388 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2005) (noting that Supreme Court precedent is unclear as to whether legislative history may be considered at first step of Chevron analysis); Coke v. Long Island

Health Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that Court
"has issued mixed messages as to whether a court may consider legislative history"
at Chevron step one), vacated, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006); Bressman, supra note 8, at 55152 (discussing Court's separate approaches to statutory construction at Chevron
step one).
50. See Zuni, 550 U.S. at 104-22 (Stevens, J., concurring and Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting upon majority's consideration of statutory purpose and legislative history prior to plain language).
51. 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
52. See id. at 84-86 (summarizing question presented).
53. See id. at 89-100 (applying Chevron). Interestingly, the Court's analysis of
statutory purpose and legislative history seems to simultaneously encompass both
Chevron steps one and two. See id. at 90 ("Considerations other than language provide us with unusually strong indications that Congress intended to leave the Secretary free to use the calculation method before us and that the Secretary's chosen
method is a reasonable one."); see also id. at 93 ("Thus, the history and purpose of
the disregard instruction indicate that the Secretary's calculation formula is a reasonable method that carries out Congress' likely intent in enacting the statutory
provision before us.").
54. See id. at 89-100 (considering legislature history and statutory purpose
prior to plain language). Justice Breyer noted that the order of analysis "depart[ed] from a normal order of discussion, namely an order that first considers
Zuni's statutory language argument." Id. at 89-90. Nonetheless, Justice Breyer
concluded that "because of the technical nature of the language in question," examination of statutory purpose at the outset was necessary to "illuminate [the
Court's] subsequent analysis" of the text. See id. at 90 (justifying Court's order of
analysis).
55. Compare id. at 104-07 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that legislative history may, under certain circumstances, be determinative of congressional intent at
Chevron step one), with id. at 108-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative
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curring, Justice Stevens stated that Chevron instructs a court to use traditional tools of statutory construction to ascertain congressional intent, and
stated that "legislative history is, of course, a traditional tool of statutory
construction." 5 6 Applying Chevron step one, Justice Stevens argued that
Zuni presented the rare circumstance in which clear legislative history,
rather than ambiguous statutory text, should determine congressional intent.5 7 As justification for this conclusion, Justice Stevens explained that
there is no reason why a court must confine analysis to, or begin analysis
with, the statutory text if other tools of statutory construction provide clear
evidence of congressional intent as to the precise question at issue. 58 Dissenting, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's consideration of legislative
history prior to statutory text, arguing that such practice improperly
59
frames analysis such that otherwise unambiguous text seems ambiguous.
Further, Justice Scalia criticized Justice Stevens's argument that clear legislative history may take priority over ambiguous statutory text, labeling it "a
judge-empowering proposition." 60
In criticizing the majority's and Justice Stevens's opinions, Justice
Scalia's dissent presents the major criticisms against the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation: that legislative history is unreliable and
61
incoherent, and that its use in statutory interpretation is undemocratic.
history should not be considered at Chevron step one when plain language is
unambiguous).
56. See id. at 104-07 (Stevens, J., concurring) (justifying use of legislative history at first step in Chevron analysis).
57. See id. at 106 (noting that "the legislative history is pellucidly clear and the
statutory text is difficult to fathom"). Justice Stevens referenced past cases in
which legislative history, rather than plain language, determined the Court's construction of a statute. See id. at 104-05 (" '[I]n rare cases the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling."' (citing United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458

U.S. 564, 571 (1982))). Given these precedents, Justice Stevens stated that, even if
the text had been unambiguous, he would have found that the clear legislative
history determined congressional intent as to the question at issue. See id. at 107
n.3 ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers." (quoting Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892))). Nonetheless, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's judgment, and
also noted support for the majority's analysis of history and purpose prior to plain
language. See id. at 106 (stating that "the text is sufficiently ambiguous to justify
the Court's exegesis").
58. See id. (emphasizing clarity of legislative history concerning particular
question at issue).
59. See id. at 108-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that majority derives congressional intent from "roundabout tour" of "unenacted congressional intent and
judicially perceived statutory purpose," and noting that only after such analysis
.are we informed how the statute's plain text does not unambiguously preclude the
interpretation the Court thinks best").
60. See id. (responding to Justice Stevens's concurrence).
61. See id. at 108-22 (criticizing use of legislative history in statutory interpretation at Chevron step one). See generally Lawrence M. Sloan, Private Language,Public
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As Justice Scalia explains, Congress votes only upon the text of the statute,
and the deliberations comprising the legislative history are rarely seen or
heard by constituents. 62 Therefore, use of legislative history to cast light
upon enacted statutory text undermines the democratic rule of law by enabling judges to intervene in the lawmaking process. 63 Further, because
legislative history is not enacted, critics charge that it does not reliably
indicate congressional intent, so permitting reconstruction of congressional intent from legislative history enables judges to construe statutes
based upon their own values. 64 Significantly, Justice Scalia's dissent in
Zuni only applies this criticism against the use of legislative history to the
Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation,93 GEO.L.J. 427,
427-28 (2005) (introducing three main arguments against use of legislative history
in statutory interpretation). As Sloan succinctly describes: (1) the argument that
the use of legislative history is undemocratic is grounded in the premise that it is
not enacted; (2) the argument that legislative history is unreliable is grounded in
the premise that "history is often conflicting, and may even be planted to influence
judges in the future"; and (3) the argument that legislative history is incoherent is
grounded in the premise that it "does not represent the views of all members of
the legislature." See id. at 427 (summarizing arguments againstjudicial use of legislative history in statutory construction).
62. See Zuni, 550 U.S. at 117 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing premises for
argument against use of legislative history). Justice Scalia explains:
The only thing we know for certain both Houses of Congress (and the
President, if he signed the legislation) agreed upon is the text. Legislative history can never produce a "pellucidly clear" picture of what a law
was "intended" to mean, for the simple reason that it is never voted
upon-or ordinarily even seen or heard-by the "intending" lawgiving
entity, which consists of both Houses of Congress and the President (if he
did not veto the bill) .... Citizens arrange their affairs not on the basis of
their legislators' unexpressed intent, but on the basis of the law as it is
written and promulgated.
Id. at 117, 119.
63. See id. at 119 ("By 'depriving legislators of the assurance that ordinary
terms, used in an ordinary context, will be given a predictable meaning,' we deprive Congress of 'a sure means by which it may work the people's will."' (quoting
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting))); see also id. at
116 (stating that majority's interpretation "contort[s] the statute's language beyond recognition").
64. See id. at 117-18 (explaining impact of allowing legislative history to determine congressional intent). Specifically, Justice Scalia argued that when judges
discern congressional intent from legislative history, the intent discerned has a
"disturbing but entirely unsurprising tendency to be whatever judges think Congress must have meant, i.e., should have meant." See id. at 117 (criticizing use of
legislative history to supplant statutory text). For example, in Church of the Holy
Trinity, a case to which Justice Stevens's concurring opinion cited, Justice Scalia
noted how the Court inserted its own values into interpretation of a statute: "this
Court disregarded the plain language of a statute that forbade the hiring of a clergyman from abroad because, after all (they thought), 'this is a Christian nation,' so
Congress could not have meant what it said." Id. (quoting Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892)). The impact to such practice is
an erosion of the democratic rule of law, as isolated statements of individual congressmen become binding over the actual enacted laws. See id. at 117-19 (arguing
that rule of law demands adherence to statutory text over judicial constructions of
legislative history because we are "a Government of laws, not of men").
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circumstance of unambiguous statutory text; the dissent appears to permit
consideration of legislative history at Chevron step one when statutory text
is ambiguous and further tools of construction would aid in construing the
text.

65

C.

Application of Chevron Step One in the Circuit Courts

Prior to the decision in Geiser, the Third Circuit's application of Chevron step one resembled that of the Supreme Court: in the absence of an
express ruling, a variety of approaches to the use of legislative history developed. 66 Similar varied approaches remain the current state of Chevron
step one jurisprudence in several other circuit courts of appeals. 6 7 In contrast, the First Circuit expressly holds that use of legislative history is permitted at Chevron step one. 68
65. See id. at 108-22 (arguing that consideration of legislative history was unnecessary because text was clear, and criticizing majority opinion as 'Judicial disregard of crystal-clear text").
66. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's divergent approach to the
use of legislative history at Chevron step one prior to the Geiser decision, see infra
notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
67. For an example of the divergent approach in the Ninth Circuit, compare
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1119-26 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering text, legislative history, and canons of construction to discern clear congressional intent at
Chevron step one), rev'd on other grounds, Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker,
535 U.S. 125 (2002), with Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2008)
(indicating that Chevron step one involves determination of whether statutory text
indicates clear congressional intent). In the D.C. Circuit, compare Ohio v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that legislative history is considered at Chevron step one when statutory text is ambiguous),
with Sierra Club v. EPA, 536 F.3d 673, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discerning clear
congressional intent at Chevron step one from statutory text alone, and quoting
"Justice Frankfurter's timeless advice on statutory interpretation: '(1) Read the
statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute!") (citations omitted). For an
example of the Second Circuit's divergent approach to the use of legislative history
at Chevron step one, compare Cohen v.J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116
(2d Cir. 2007) (permitting use of legislative history at Chevron step one in order to
resolve ambiguity in statutory text), with De Batista v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 67, 71 n.3
(2d Cir. 2007) (proceeding to Chevron step two after finding textual ambiguity at
step one, and only considering legislative history at Chevron's second step). Although it has not expressly take up the issue of the permissibility of legislative
history at Chevron step one, the Second Circuit acknowledges that "the Supreme
Court has issued mixed messages" on the issue. See Coke v. Long Island Health
Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (deciding whether to consult
legislative history in particular case), vacated, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006). In Coke, rather
than expressly holding that legislative history is permitted, the Second Circuit considered legislative history at Chevron step one to discern clear congressional intent
in favor of the agency's interpretation, and then argued in the alternative that
even if legislative history were not considered, the agency's regulation would still
be upheld at Chevron step two. See id. at 118-29 (providing analysis in which legislative history is considered at step one, and alternative analysis in which legislative
history is not considered).
68. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that legislative history is permitted at Chevron step one). For further discussion of the First
Circuit's decision in Succar, see infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
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The First Circuit's Application of Chevron Step One
In Succar v. Ashcroft, 69 the First Circuit considered whether legislative

history is permitted at Chevron step one, and held that legislative history "is
permissible and even may be required." 70 This holding arose in the context of an Attorney General regulation that rendered certain aliens ineligible to apply for adjustment to permanent resident status. 7 ' The court
invalidated the regulation at Chevron's first step, finding the regulation
contrary to clear congressional intent expressed in the Illegal Immigration
72
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).
Assessing congressional intent at Chevron step one, the court found
the IIRIRA's text and structure plainly unambiguous; nonetheless, the
court also considered the statute's legislative history in order to bolster its
interpretation of the statutory text. 7 3 Justifying its decision to use legislative history in this manner, the First Circuit surveyed prior Supreme Court
as well as First Circuit cases, and concluded that legislative history may be
considered not only to resolve textual ambiguity but also to confirm the
74
In particupropriety of an interpretation of unambiguous statutory text.
69. 394 F.3d 8 (lst Cir. 2005).
70. See id. at 31 ("Our view is that where traditional doctrines of statutory
interpretation have permitted use of legislative history, its use is permissible and
may even be required at stage one of Chevron.").
71. See id. at 9, 20 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c) (8)) (summarizing regulation at
issue). The regulation applied to aliens granted parole in removal proceedings,
and denied such aliens eligibility to apply for adjustment to permanent resident
status. See id. (explaining regulation). In Succar, an immigration judge applied the
regulation to an alien granted parole from removal proceedings, pending resolution of the alien's asylum claim on appeal. See id. at 11-12 (providing factual context from which challenge to regulation emerged). While paroled from removal,
the alien married a United States citizen and accordingly sought permanent resident status, but the immigration judge found that the Attorney General regulation
denied the alien eligibility to apply for such adjustment of status. See id. (explaining application of regulation to facts of case). The alien argued on appeal that the
Attorney General regulation was inconsistent with congressional intent, and was
thus invalid. See id. at 21 (summarizing appellant's arguments).
72. See id. at 10, 24 (finding regulation inconsistent with congressional intent). Specifically, the court found that Congress intended to reserve eligibility
determinations for Congress, and did not permit the Attorney General to issue
regulations on the issue. See id. at 24 (discerning congressional intent).
73. See id. at 32 ("We look to legislative history to check our understanding
and determine whether there is a clearly expressed intention by the Congress
which is contrary to the plain language of the statute.") (citation omitted). In
construing Chevron step one, the court noted that it requires use of all "devices of
judicial construction" to attempt to discern congressional intent, and that legislative history in particular may be used when construing text to see if "any 'serious
question . . . even about purely textual ambiguity' is left." See id. at 22-23 (citing
Gen. Dynamic Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004)) (explaining nature of
analysis at Chevron step one).
74. See id. at 30-32 (analyzing Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent to
conclude that legislative history may be used to "discern and/or to confirm legislative intent") (citations omitted). In addition, the First Circuit also noted that while
other circuits had not expressly decided upon the permissibility of using legislative
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lar, the court noted that the direction of recent Supreme Court cases favored the use of legislative history, as Justice Kennedy, who previously
condemned its use, subsequently joined in majority opinions consulting
legislative history at Chevron step one. 75 Finally, responding to criticism
against the use of legislative history, the court reasoned that "[t]he perceived dangers of the use of legislative history are particularly lessened
where the legislative history is used as a check on an understanding obtained from text and structure." 76 Thus, under Succar, the First Circuit
77
definitively permits analysis of legislative history at Chevron step one.
2.

The Third Circuit's Application of Chevron Step One Prior to Geiser

Until Geiser, the Third Circuit failed to expressly decide which tools of
statutory construction are permitted at Chevron step one. 78 To be sure, in
more than one case, the Third Circuit recognized uncertainty as to
whether legislative history should be consulted at Chevron step one-and
ultimately decided to consult it, although without expressly ruling on its
applicability. 79 Given the lack of an express ruling, divergent approaches
to the use of legislative history at Chevron step one developed.8 0
In one approach, analysis of legislative history was simply one of several tools of statutory construction used to discern congressional intent.8 1
Under this approach, the court used both a statute's text as well as its
legislative history to discern whether clear congressional intent existed as
to the precise question at issue.8 2 As such, the court considered legislative
history at Chevron step one, reference to legislative history "appear[ed] to be the
functional approach of some other circuits." See id. at 31 (surveying cases from
Second and Ninth Circuits) (citations omitted).
75. See id.at 30 n.30 (discerning direction of Supreme Court authority to

favor use of legislative history) (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 31.
77. See id. at 32 (concluding that legislative history is permitted not only to
resolve textual ambiguity but also to confirm textual analysis).
78. See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing
prior Third Circuit cases noting uncertainty as to whether legislative history should
be considered at Chevron step one) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 937
(2009).
79. See Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 388 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2005) ("It is not clear whether it is appropriate for us to consider legislative
history to determine whether a statute is unambiguous at this point in Chevron
analysis. However, it is worth noting that the legislative history of [the statute]
supports the conclusion."); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 249
n.12 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that "[i]t is not entirely clear to what extent it is appropriate for us to consider legislative history in analyzing a regulation under the first
prong of Chevron," but nonetheless assessing legislative history).
80. For discussion of these divergent approaches, see infra notes 81-86 and
accompanying text.

81. For citation to cases applying this approach, see infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Yuposov v. Att'y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 202-05 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding clear congressional intent from examination of text and legislative history);
Woodall, 432 F.3d at 245-46 (considering both text and legislative history at Chevron
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history both in cases in which it found statutory text to be ambiguous and
needed legislative history to attempt to resolve the ambiguity, and also in
cases in which the court found the text to be unambiguous and used the
83
legislative history to confirm its textual interpretation.
In contrast to cases in which both the text and legislative history are
considered at Chevron step one, a separate line of Third Circuit cases considered only the plain meaning of the statutory text. 84 To be sure, some of
these cases involved unambiguous statutory text, enabling the court to discern congressional intent from text alone. 8 5 In the other cases, however,
the Third Circuit found statutory text ambiguous at Chevron step one, but
step one, and stating that analysis only proceeds to second step when all "devices of
judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent" (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600
(2004))); Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no clear
congressional intent at Chevron step one after consideration of text and legislative
history); OWCP v. Sun Ship, Inc., 150 F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
court will only defer to agency's permissible interpretation of statute "when the
statute does not directly speak to the issue and congressional intent cannot be
gleaned from the text of the statute, or its legislative history"); Marincas v. Lewis,
92 F.3d 195, 200-01 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that "Congress expressed a clear
and unambiguous intent with regard to the precise question at issue" based upon
consideration of, among other things, plain language and legislative history);
Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 907, 912-14 (3d Cir. 1990) (examining text and legislative history, and concluding that "legislative history does not
convince us that there existed a clearly expressed congressional intent contrary to
the plain words of [the statute]"); Grocery Town Mkt., Inc. v. United States, 848
F.2d 392, 394-96 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding clear congressional intent at Chevron step
one after examination of plain language and legislative history); Kean v. Heckler,
799 F.2d 895, 898-902 (3d Cir. 1986) (examining statute's text and legislative history before proceeding to Chevron step two); cf. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan,
958 F.2d 537, 545-47 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing rule of construction that consideration
of legislative history is unnecessary if plain language is clear, but considering legislative history nonetheless because district court had relied upon it).
83. For cases in which the Third Circuit considered legislative history at step
one to resolve textual ambiguity, see, e.g., Yuposov, 518 F.3d at 202-04 (looking to
legislative history to overcome textual ambiguity at Chevron step one); Smriko, 387
F.3d at 288 (providing that "the first step in interpreting a statute is to determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard
to the particular dispute," but also noting that if plain language is ambiguous,
courts should consider other indicia of congressional intent such as legislative history). For cases in which the Third Circuit considered legislative history even after
finding the text plainly unambiguous, see, e.g., Woodall, 432 F.3d at 245 (noting
that legislative history "bolstered" court's reading of statutory text); Grocery Town
Mkt., 848 F.2d at 395 (noting that legislative history provided "even stronger indication" of congressional intent than plain language alone).
84. For citation to these cases considering only plain meaning at Chevron step
one, see infra notes 85-86.
85. See, e.g., Reese Bros. v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 234-41 (3d Cir. 2006)
(finding, at Chevron step one, that statutory text unambiguously indicated congressional intent); Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 209-14 (3d Cir. 2002) (ascertaining clear congressional intent at Chevron step one after assessing plain language as
well as statutory structure and context); Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 151926 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding clear congressional intent from unambiguous plain
language).
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rather than use legislative history to resolve the ambiguity, the court pro86
ceeded to Chevron step two.
III.

UNITED STATES V. GEISER: THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXPRESSLY CONSIDERS
WHETHER LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Is PERMITTED AT
CHEVRON STEP ONE

Recent Third Circuit cases preceding Geisercontinued the divided approach to Chevron step one, with some cases considering legislative history
in order to glean clear congressional intent, and others relegating analysis
of legislative history to Chevron step two. 87 In Geiser, the Third Circuit expressly addressed, for the first time, whether a court may examine legisla88
tive history in discerning congressional intent at Chevron step one.
Explaining that Third Circuit cases support analysis of statutory text only,
and emphasizing recent Supreme Court cases providing that reference to
legislative history is unnecessary in the face of unambiguous statutory text,
the Third Circuit held in Geiser that legislative history should not be con89
sidered at the first step of Chevron analysis.
A.

FactualBackground

In Geiser, the issue of whether legislative history may be considered at
Chevron step one arose in the context of a denaturalization action. 90 Anton Geiser, a natural Yugoslavian of German descent who had been
drafted into the Waffen Schutzstaffel (SS) to serve as an armed guard at
multiple Nazi concentration camps, applied for a visa under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Refugee Relief Act (RRA). 9 1
86. See, e.g.,
Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v. Thompson, 297 F.3d 273,

284-87 (3d Cir. 2002) (assessing only statutory text at Chevron step one, but considering, among other things, legislative history at step two); Appalachian States Low-

Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 108-10 (3d Cir. 1996)
(construing Chevron step one as determination of "whether the plain meaning of
the statute speaks to the precise question at issue"); Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448,

451-52 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding textual ambiguity at Chevron step one, but concluding at step two that agency interpretation is reasonable based upon statute's legislative history); Conoco, Inc. v. Skinner, 970 F.2d 1206, 1216-19 (3d Cir. 1992)
(assessing only plain language at Chevron step one, and legislative history at step
two).

87. Compare Yuposov, 518 F.3d at 202-05 (considering legislative history at
Chevron step one and discerning clear congressional intent), with Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., 297 F.3d at 284-87 (assessing statutory text at Chevron step one and
legislative history at step two).
88. See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292-94 (3d Cir. 2008) (assessing
parameters of Chevron step one analysis), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 937 (2009).
89. See id. at 294 ("In sum, the current state of Supreme Court and Third
Circuit jurisprudence demonstrates that legislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one.") (citations omitted).
90. See id. at 290 (deciding whether to affirm order of district court revoking
appellant's citizenship).

91. See id. (describing Geiser's background). Further facts are brutal: Geiser
was chosen for a "Death's Head" battalion, which was responsible for guarding
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Geiser obtained a visa in 1956, entered the United States, and earned naturalization as a United States citizen in 1962.92

Over four decades later, upon learning of Geiser's service as an SS
concentration camp guard, the United States filed a complaint to revoke
Geiser's citizenship. 93 The United States argued that Geiser was ineligible
for a visa under the RRA because he "personally advocated or assisted in
the persecution of any person or group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin." 94 Applying Chevron, the district court found the
RRA's plain language unambiguous, and concluded that serving as a concentration camp guard constitutes "personally advocat[ing] or assisting[ing] in .

.

. persecution" under the RRA.9 5 Accordingly, the district

court concluded that Geiser's visa and naturalization were unlawful, and
96
ordered revocation of his citizenship.
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Geiser challenged the district court's
Chevron analysis. 97 Specifically, Geiser contended that legislative history
revealed that the State Department interpreted the word "persecution" in
the RRA to render ineligible for naturalization only those former concentration camp guards who were also deemed war criminals. 98 Geiser argued that the district court should have considered this legislative history
at Chevron step one to "confirm" its statutory analysis, as the legislative his-

concentration camps, and was instructed that if a prisoner tried to escape, he
should shoot the prisoner. See id. (explaining Geiser's service as member of armed
SS guard). Geiser served at three concentration camps, and admitted that two
were places of persecution. See id. (discussing Geiser's role in Nazi persecution).
When Allied Forces liberated a concentration camp that Geiser guarded, Geiser
fled. See id. (providing further facts concerning Geiser's background). Geiser
worked in Germany and Austria after the war, until he applied for a United States
visa in 1956. See id. (introducing account of Geiser's naturalization).
92. See id. (explaining Geiser's naturalization).
93. See id. at 290-91 (explaining denaturalization complaint that formed basis
for appeal).
94. Id. (citation omitted). The INA requires revocation of citizenship that is
illegally procured; thus, the legality of Geiser's naturalization turned upon Geiser's
eligibility for a visa under the RRA. See id. at 291 (providing relevant immigration
law) (citations omitted). The Government argued that Geiser's service as a concentration camp guard rendered his RRA visa, and thus his citizenship, unlawful.

See id. (explaining legal basis for denaturalization complaint).
95. See id. (presenting district court's reasoning).

Specifically, the district

court rejected Geiser's argument that the term "persecution" in the RRA is ambiguous, and concluded at Chevron step one that the unambiguous plain language of
the RRA precluded Geiser's eligibility for a visa. See id. (explaining district court's
Chevron analysis).
96. See id. (summarizing district court's disposition of case).
97. See id. at 291-92 (presenting Geiser's argument concerning application of
Chevron standard of review).
98. See id. at 291-94 (summarizing Geiser's argument, as well as State Department interpretation to which Geiser argued court should defer).
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tory revealed ambiguity in the RRA's use of the term "persecution." 99
Given ambiguity at Chevron step one, Geiser argued that analysis should
proceed to step two, where the State Department's interpretation of "persecution" was reasonable and thus entitled to deference. 10 0
B.

The Third Circuit Rejects Considerationof Legislative History at
Chevron Step One

To resolve Geiser's arguments on appeal, the court defined the parameters of Chevron's first step. 10 1 Noting the government's construction
of Chevron step one-that consideration of legislative history is inappropriate when statutory text is unambiguous-the court stated that "[t]he Government is correct.' 0 2 Yet, rather than narrowly state that analysis of
legislative history is not permitted when statutory text is unambiguous, the
court's opinion broadly states that "legislative history should not be con10 3
sidered at Chevron step one."'
The court harmonized its holding with prior Third Circuit and recent
Supreme Court cases. 10 4 As to Third Circuit precedent, the court noted
that no case commands consideration of legislative history at Chevron step
one.' 0 5 Instead, the court explained that one Third Circuit case that had
considered legislative history only did so because, given ambiguous guidance from the Supreme Court, "we covered our bases. " 10 6 Further, the
court explained that although another Third Circuit case considered legislative history at Chevron step one, the case illustrates the criticisms against
the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, and the case's
holding instead rested upon plain meaning. 10 7 As to Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit reasoned that despite older decisions' reference
99. See id. at 292 (explaining Geiser's argument that court should "refer to
legislative history to confirm its step one statutory analysis" (citing Santiago v.
GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 388 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005))).
100. See id. (noting that Geiser argued that district court should have proceeded to inquire at Chevron step two whether State Department interpretation is
reasonable).
101. See id. (assessing whether district court erred by excluding legislative history from consideration at Chevron step one).
102. See id. (agreeing with government's construction of Chevron step one).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 292-94 (reasoning that reference to legislative history at Chevron
step one is unnecessary).
105. See id. at 293 (stating that "closer look at Santiago and subsequent cases"
confirms that legislative history should not be considered).
106. See id. (citing Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 388
n.3 (3d Cir. 2005)) (establishing that Third Circuit precedent does not require
reference to legislative history).
107. See id. at 293-94 ("Our consideration of legislative history illustrated 'the
perils of appealing to [selected comments from the floor debate] as a guide to
statutory meaning;' we rejected Szehinsky's argument largely because 'the statutory language is not ambiguous, and is contrary to [his] interpretation.'" (citing
Szehinsky v. Att'y Gen., 432 F.3d 253, 254-60 (3d Cir. 2005))).
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to legislative history when construing a statute at Chevron step one, recent
decisions returned the Court to "its original mode of analysis, which does
not include a consideration of legislative history."' 08 The Court specifically cites the Supreme Court's application of Chevron step one in Zuni,
which provides that legislative history "would [not] be determinative"
when statutory text is unambiguous and therefore sufficient to indicate
clear congressional intent. 0 9
Based on its review of this precedent, the Third Circuit concluded in
Geiser that "we no longer find it necessary to consider legislative history at
Chevron step one," and affirmed the order of the district court to revoke
Geiser's citizenship.' 10 Rather than consult legislative history, the Third
Circuit held that a court determines whether there is clear congressional
intent at Chevron step one by "looking at the 'plain' and 'literal' language
of the statute. " "'
108. See id. at 293 (discussing Supreme Court precedent) (citations omitted).
In particular, the court noted that the Supreme Court had referenced legislative
history at Chevron step one in Brown & Williamson. See id. (citing FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). The court explained, however, that recent Supreme Court cases provided that reference to legislative history
is unnecessary if the plain language is unambiguous. See id. (citing Zuni Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007) ("[N]ormally, neither the
legislative history nor the reasonableness of the [agency interpretation] would be
determinative if the plain language of the statute unambiguously indicated [Congress's intent]."); Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132-33
(2002) ("[R]eference to legislative history is inappropriate when the text of the
statute is unambiguous.")).
109. See id. (citing Zuni, 550 U.S. at 93) (explaining that recent Supreme
Court cases support proposition that legislative history should not be considered).
In its discussion of Zuni, the Third Circuit's opinion in Geiser does not clearly explain that the Court in Zuni only narrowly provided that legislative history could
not be determinative in the face of unambiguous statutory text, rather than entirely prohibiting legislative history at Chevron step one. See id. at 293 (discussing
Supreme Court's application of Chevron step one in Zuni); see also Zuni, 550 U.S. at
93 (["N] ormally neither the legislative history nor the reasonableness of the Secretary's method would be determinative if the plain language of the statute unambiguously indicated that Congress sought to foreclose the Secretary's
interpretation."). Indeed, Zuni did consider legislative history at Chevron step
one-yet the Third Circuit's opinion in Geiser fails to acknowledge this crucial fact.
See Zuni, 550 U.S. at 89-100 (assessing legislative history prior to statutory text at
Chevron step one because of Court's conclusion that text was ambiguous); see also
Geiser, 527 F.3d at 293 (discussing Zuni). For further discussion of the Supreme
Court's application of Chevron step one in Zuni, see supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
110. See Geiser, 527 F.3d at 293 (concluding from Supreme Court as well as
Third Circuit precedent that legislative history need not be considered).
111. See id. at 294 (citing Zuni, 550 U.S. at 94) (holding that statutory text, not
legislative history, is assessed at Chevron step one). Applying this construction of
Chevron step one, the court concluded that the statutory language unambiguously
indicated that an armed guard at a concentration camp personally assisted in persecution under the RRA, and as such, affirmed the district court's order to revoke
Geiser's citizenship. See id. at 294-99 (applying Chevron step one to facts of case).
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DOES GEISER CATEGORICALLY PRECLUDE USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
AT CHEVRON STEP ONE?

The rhetoric in Geiserappears to categorically exclude the use of legislative history at Chevron step one: the court states that "legislative history
should not be considered," and that "we no longer find it necessary to
consider legislative history at Chevron step one." 1 12 Yet, rhetoric aside,
both the facts of Geiser as well as many of the cases to which the court cites
in the opinion indicate that Geiser's holding is actually narrow.11 3 Under a
narrow interpretation, legislative history is only precluded when statutory
language is plainly unambiguous.1 1 4 Interpreting Geiser in this narrow
manner creates consistency with other courts' Chevron step one jurisprudence, and avoids the harms identified in criticism against the use of legis1 5
lative history in statutory interpretation.
A.

Geiser Is a Narrow Holding

A narrow interpretation of Geiser provides that legislative history may
not be considered at Chevron step one when statutory text unambiguously
indicates congressional intent, but that legislative history may be considered when statutory text is plainly ambiguous and further tools of statutory
construction are necessary to discern congressional intent.1 16 Both the
facts as well as many of the cases cited in Geiser support this narrow
1 17
interpretation.'
The facts of Geiser support a narrow interpretation of its holding because the court found the statutory text at issue to be plainly unambiguous.118 Indeed, it seems common sense that service as an armed guard at
a concentration camp constitutes "persecution." 1 9 Geiser argued none112. Id. at 292, 294.
113. For an analysis of how the facts of Geiser and the cited cases warrant a
narrow interpretation, see infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of how Geisers holding may be interpreted narrowly, see
infra note 116 and accompanying text.
115. For arguments in favor of interpreting Geiser's holding concerning Chevron step one narrowly, see infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
116. See Geiser, 527 F.3d at 292 (rejecting Geiser's argument that legislative
history should be used to "confirm" court's interpretation of unambiguous statutory text, and affirming Government's argument that, "if the statutory text is unambiguous, it is inappropriate and unnecessary to inquire into the legislative history
at step one"); see also Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2004) (providing that "the first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular
dispute," but also noting that if plain language is ambiguous, other indicia of congressional intent such as legislative history are considered).
117. For a discussion of how the facts and cases cited in Geiser warrant a narrow interpretation, see infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
118. See Geiser, 527 F.3d at 294-99 (finding no textual or structural ambiguity
in the RRA that service at concentration camp constitutes "persecution").
119. Cf id. at 290 (noting that Geiser admitted that two of concentration
camps where he served were places of persecution).
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theless that legislative history should be considered because it revealed
that the seemingly unambiguous statutory text was actually subject to more
than one plausible interpretation. 120 When the court rejected Geiser's argument and held that legislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one, this holding was specifically tied to the fact of the plainly
unambiguous statutory text, which rendered use of legislative history unnecessary. 12 1 Thus, although Geiser prohibits use of legislative history to
create ambiguity in otherwise unambiguous statutory text, it remains permissible to use legislative history at Chevron step one to resolve ambiguity
122
in the statutory text.
The Supreme Court cases cited in Geiser provide further support for
interpreting its holding in this narrow manner. 123 The cases cited provide
that because statutory interpretation begins by assessing statutory text, if
the text is plainly unambiguous, resort to legislative history is unnecessary. 124 On the other hand, legislative history may still be considered to
resolve ambiguous plain language-as the Supreme Court did in the Chev12 5
ron decision and, recently, in Zuni.
B.

Benefits of a Narrow Interpretation

Interpreting Geiser narrowly creates consistency with other courts'
Chevron step on jurisprudence. 1 26 Because the First Circuit broadly permits the use of legislative history to resolve textual ambiguity as well as to
confirm an interpretation of unambiguous statutory text, reading Geiserto
permit the use of legislative history to resolve textual ambiguity would be a
critical first step towards harmonizing the decision with the First Circuit's
120. See id. at 292 (presenting Geiser's argument that consideration of legislative history was necessary to "confirm" analysis of plain language).
121. See id. ("The Government contends that if the statutory text is unambiguous, it is inappropriate and unnecessary to inquire into the legislative history at
step one. The Government is correct that legislative history should not be considered at Chevron step one.").
122. See id. at 291-94 (construing Chevron step one based upon facts of particular case, including fact of plainly unambiguous statutory text).
123. See id. at 293-94 (surveying Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning
Chevron step one) (citations omitted).
124. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007)
("[N]ormally neither the legislative history nor the reasonableness of the [agency
interpretation] would be determinative if the plain language of the statute unambiguously indicated [Congress's intent]."); Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker,
535 U.S. 125, 132-33 (2002) ("[R]eference to legislative history is inappropriate
when the text of the statute is unambiguous.").
125. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
862 (1984) (considering legislative history at Chevron step one); Zuni, 550 U.S. at
89-93 (same).
126. For a discussion of how a narrow interpretation harmonizes the Third
Circuit with other courts' applications of Chevron step one, see infra notes 127-29
and accompanying text.
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approach. 12 7 Moreover, interpreting Geiser to permit the use of legislative
history at Chevron step one to resolve textual ambiguity is consistent with a
long line of Third Circuit as well as Supreme Court cases, which consult
legislative history at the first stage of Chevron analysis.1 28 Citation to the
substantial body of caselaw considering legislative history-most of which
the Geiser opinion does not address-remains a vital tool for persuading a
29
panel of Third Circuit judges to consult legislative history.1
From a policy perspective, consulting legislative history in order to
resolve textual ambiguity avoids several of the harms identified in criticism
against the use legislative history in statutory interpretation. 1 30 For example, the risk of undermining the democratic rule of law is greatly minimized when legislative history is not used to override plainly unambiguous
text, but rather is used to determine how ambiguous text applies in a pre127. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 30-32 (1st Cir. 2005) (reasoning that
legislative history may be consulted at Chevron step one).
128. See Grocery Town Mkt., Inc. v. United States, 848 F.2d 392, 397-98 (3d
Cir. 1988) (Becker, C.J., concurring) (stating that consideration of reasonableness
of the agency's construction of statute at Chevron step two is unnecessary when "the
statute or the statute plus legislative history is clear"). The majority opinion in
Grocery Town Market also assessed legislative history at Chevron step one. See id. at
394-96 (majority opinion) (discerning clear congressional intent from plain language and legislative history). This construction of Chevron's first step remains a
vital strand of recent Third Circuit Chevron jurisprudence. See Yuposov v. Att'y
Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 202-05 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding clear congressional intent upon
consideration of text and legislative history); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
432 F.3d 235, 246-49 (3d Cir. 2005) (considering plain language and legislative
history, and noting that court proceeds to Chevron step two only when all "devices
ofjudicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent") (citation omitted); Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 288 (3d
Cir. 2004) (assessing text and legislative history at Chevron step one).
As for the Supreme Court, empirical analysis reveals that "there can no longer
be serious doubt whether Supreme Court precedent instructs judges to consider
relevant legislative history in applying Chevron deference. It does." Eskridge &
Baer, supra note 1, at 1135-36. Even ardent textualist Justice Scalia condones the
use of legislative history in certain circumstances. See Zuni, 550 U.S. at 109-22
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing use of legislative history in specific circumstance
in which text is unambiguous); see also Scalia, supra note 11, at 515 ("[I]t seems to
me that the 'traditional tools of statutory construction' include not merely text and
legislative history but also, quite specifically, the consideration of policy consequences."). For comprehensive citation to Supreme Court cases considering legislative history at Chevron step one, see supra notes 46 and 47.
Finally, although the Third Circuit's opinion in Geiser situates its holding
within recent Supreme Court precedent-particularly the Supreme Court's decision in Zuni-the Geiser opinion fails to attend to the nuances of the Supreme
Court's application of Chevron step one in Zuni. For criticism of Geiser's treatment
of Zuni, see supra note 109.
129. For citation to the Third Circuit and Supreme Court cases consulting
legislative history at Chevron step one in order to resolve ambiguity in statutory text,
see supra note 128.
130. See generally Sloan, supra note 61 (summarizing arguments against use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation). For further discussion of the criticisms against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, see supra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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cise circumstance. 13 1 Similarly, reliability concerns regarding whether legislative history is an accurate reflection of congressional intent are not a
compelling reason to reject its consideration at Chevron step one when the
legislative history is not deemed determinative, but instead is used in conjunction with other tools of statutory construction to interpret ambiguous
text. 132 Given that the policies against the use of legislative history are
largely inapplicable when legislative history is used only to resolve textual
ambiguity, and given the substantial body of precedent consulting legislative history at Chevron step one, Geiser should be interpreted narrowly to
prohibit legislative history at Chevron step one only when statutory text is
133
plainly unambiguous.
V.

GEISER's SIGNIFICANCE

Defining the scope of Geiser's holding concerning legislative history is
34
important, both from a practical as well as a theoretical perspective.'
Excluding legislative history at Chevron step one makes it more likely that
deference will be achieved at step two, as ambiguous plain language at
step one would move analysis to step two, where the reasonability standard
is easily met.1 35 Chevron deference is maximum deference; an agency's
interpretation controls interpretation of the statute when Chevron defer131. See Succar, 394 F.3d at 31 (explaining that use of legislative history at
Chevron step one does not risk perceived dangers of using legislative history in
statutory interpretation, so long as legislative history is not used to override statutory text); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1093 (arguing that legislative history
"provides legitimating links between original enactments and new applications");
cf Zuni, 550 U.S. at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that democratic rule of law
is undermined through "elevation" of legislative history over clear statutory text).
132. Cf Zuni, 550 U.S. at 106 (Stevens, J., concurring) (providing that legislative history is one among many tools of statutory construction that indicate congressional intent); Woodall, 432 F.3d at 245-49 (considering legislative history as
one of several devices of construction).
133. For the argument from policies underlying the use of legislative history
in statutory interpretation, see supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. For the
argument from precedent, see supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of practical implications, see infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of implications from a theoretical perspective,
see infra notes 135-36, 138, and accompanying text.
135. See Bressman, supra note 8, at 557-58 (explaining that, given demise of
nondelegation doctrine, courts deploy statutory interpretation in attempt to constrain broad delegations of authority to agencies, yet attempt is frustrated because
Congress intended broad delegation); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An
EmpiricalStudy of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALEJ. ON REG.
1, 14-15 (1998) (summarizing minority view among proponents of interpretive
model of Chevron, that textualistjudges are more like to defer to agency interpretation); Russell L. Weaver, AdministrativeLaw DiscussionForum: Teaching (and Testing)
Administrative Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 273, 275-281 (2000) (arguing that flexibility in
tools of statutory construction at Chevron step one eases challenge of contesting
agency interpretation in court). But see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1151-52
(reporting that empirical research disproved hypothesis that assessing only plain
meaning at Chevron step one resulted in greater instances of deference).
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ence is accorded.1 3 6 Therefore, from a practical perspective, excluding
legislative history from Chevron step one may increase the difficulty of challenging an agency regulation. 137 From a theoretical perspective, increasing the frequency of Chevron deference is significant because it has the
potential to further shift the power of statutory interpretation from the
138
courts to administrative agencies.
For practitioners on both sides, then, Geiser is significant.' 39 Geiser's
rhetoric suggests that the Third Circuit may have categorically excluded
legislative history from consideration at Chevron step one. 14 0 On the other
hand, arguments grounded in Geisers facts, prior precedent, and the policies underlying use of legislative history suggest that Geiser's holding concerning legislative history is best interpreted narrowly, such that legislative
history remains permissible at Chevron step one to resolve ambiguity in
statutory text.

141

Melina Forte

136. See Sheldon, supra note 39, at 504 (explaining that Chevron deference is
"absolute deference").
137. See Weaver, supra note 135, at 275-81 (providing that challenging agency
interpretations becomes less difficult if greater number of tools of construction are
permitted at Chevron step one).
138. See Criddle, supra note 1, at 1277 (stating that Chevron "fundamentally
altered the division of labor between courts and agencies in statutory interpretation"); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 1, at 1198-1200 (discussing potential for deference to administrative agencies to override stare decisis principles); Sunstein, Law
and Administration,supra note 1, at 2074-75 (describing Chevron as "counter-Marbury
for the administrative state" because it enables agencies to share in judiciary's
traditional function of "saying what the law is").

139. For discussion of the importance of defining Geiser's scope concerning
Chevron step one, see supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
140. For discussion of the seemingly broad rhetoric in Geiser, see supra note

112 and accompanying text.
141. For those arguments establishing Geiser's holding concerning Chevron
step one as narrow, see supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
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